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Introduction
A significant share of low- and middle-
income American families appears to be
saving little, either for retirement or for any
other purpose.  Families with income
below $40,000 have low rates of
coverage under employer-provided
pensions, are extremely unlikely to
contribute to Individual Retirement
Arrangements (IRAs), and in 2001 had
median net financial wealth outside of
retirement accounts of just $2,200.1
Researchers and policy makers alike have
long considered ways to raise saving
among these families.2 The conventional
approach to subsidizing saving through
401(k) plans and traditional IRAs provides
tax deductions for contributions and tax
deferral on account earnings.  This
approach has not enticed low- and
middle-income families to contribute very
much to retirement accounts, in part
because the value of tax preferences is
modest since these families face low
marginal income tax rates.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of a large randomized field experiment, carried out with H&R Block, offering
matching incentives for IRA contributions at the time of tax preparation. About 15,000 H&R Block clients, in
60 offices in predominantly low- and middle-income neighborhoods in St. Louis, were randomly offered a
20 percent match on IRA contributions, a 50 percent match, or no match (the control group). The evaluation
generates two broad findings.  First, higher match rates significantly raise IRA participation and
contributions.  Take-up rates were 3 percent for the control group, 10 percent in the 20 percent match
group, and 17 percent in the 50 percent match group.  Average IRA contributions (excluding the match) for
the 20 percent and 50 percent match groups were 4 and 8 times higher than in the control group,
respectively.  Second, several additional findings are inconsistent with the full-information, rational-saver
model, and suggest instead that professional tax assistance, information provision, and ease of saving can
play important roles in encouraging IRA contributions among low- and middle-income families.  For
example, we find more modest effects on take-up and amounts contributed from the existing Saver’s
Credit, which provides an effective match for retirement saving contributions through the tax code; we
suspect that the differences may reflect the complexity of the Saver's Credit as enacted, and the way in
which its effective match is presented.  Taken together, our results suggest that the combination of a clear
and understandable match for saving, easily accessible savings vehicles, the opportunity to use part of an
income tax refund to save, and professional assistance could generate a significant increase in retirement
saving participation and contributions, even among middle- and low-income households.The Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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In contrast, the provision of matching
contributions could potentially represent a
much more promising way to bolster
incentives for low- and middle-income
households to save.  Matching
contributions can be independent of the
individual’s marginal tax rate, and thus
provide a significant incentive for saving
even to people in low marginal tax
brackets.  Little is known, however, about
whether such matching contributions
would in fact induce a meaningful fraction
of low- and middle-income families to
save for retirement.
The Saver’s Credit offers one example of
matching contributions provided by the
Federal government.  Enacted in 2001,
the credit provides an income tax
reduction of up to 50 percent of funds
contributed to a 401(k) or IRA by qualified
filers.   The credit as enacted may not
accomplish its full potential, however, in
part due to its low income thresholds for
eligibility, in part because it is not
refundable, and in part, perhaps, because
it has not been effectively advertised or
explained to tax filers.3
Matching contributions are also present in
many employer-sponsored 401(k) plans.
Previous studies have found mixed
evidence of the effects of match rates on
401(k) participation and contributions.4 A
significant concern in these studies,
furthermore, is that the match rates
offered by firms in 401(k) plans may not
be independent of worker characteristics
at the firm, which makes it difficult to
disentangle the independent effect of
matching rates on contributions.  Another
concern is that the results apply mainly to
relatively affluent households in the
presence of automatic payroll deduction
and the other workplace features
associated with 401(k) plans, which could
affect contributions.  Therefore, the results
may not be directly applicable to low- and
middle-income families or to policy
interventions that occur outside the
workplace.
This paper reports evidence from the first
large-scale, randomized field experiment
ever conducted regarding the effects of
matching rates on the willingness of
low- and middle-income families to
contribute to IRAs.  By randomizing the
matching rate across tax filers, we are
able to identify not only the impact of the
presence of a match, but also how
variations in the matching rate affect
both take-up and contribution levels.
Unlike the Saver’s Credit, the match
provided in this experiment is available
in full to (virtually) all tax filers, has a
simple structure, is explained to potential
account holders in a straightforward
manner, and is deposited directly into an
IRA rather than reducing income tax
liability.  Unlike 401(k) matching
contributions, the match provided is
independent of individuals’ characteristics
and of the workplace environment.  
The field experiment was conducted in
conjunction with H&R Block, the largest
tax preparer in the country, and co-
organized with the Outreach & Business
Development Group at H&R Block.  H&R
Block paid the direct costs associated
with implementing the experiment,
including the matching contributions,
advertising materials, and the training of
tax professionals. The experiment was run
in 60 H&R Block tax preparation offices in
the St. Louis metro area from March 5th
to April 5th, 2005.  The experiment was
built around the Express IRA (X-IRA)
product offered by H&R Block, which
allows clients to make IRA contributions
at the time of tax preparation and to fund
those contributions with part or all of their
federal income tax refunds or from other
sources.  In effect, the X-IRA allows the
client to “split” their anticipated refund
between contributions to a retirement
account and other uses. 
Each client preparing a tax return in one
of the 60 offices during the period was
randomly assigned to one of three match
rates for X-IRA contributions: zero (the
control group), 20 percent, or 50 percent.
Contributions were matched up to
$1,000, a limit that applied separately for
each spouse for married tax filers. Each
client, including those in the control3 may 2005
group, received a waiver of the $15 set-
up fee for opening an X-IRA.  The
minimum X-IRA contribution is $300.
The evaluation generates two
overarching sets of conclusions.  First,
match rates can have large effects on
IRA participation and contributions.
Take-up rates are 3 percent, 10 percent,
and 17 percent, respectively, for the
control group, the 20-percent match
group and the 50-percent match group.
Conditional on take-up, average
contribution levels (excluding the match)
are $860, $1,280, and $1,310,
respectively.  With the match included,
average IRA deposits were $860,
$1,480, and $1,870 respectively.  Taking
participation rates into account and
including the matching contributions,
average IRA deposits with the 20 percent
and 50 percent matches were 5 and 11
times higher than with no match.  The
effects are particularly large for married
tax filers, with take-up rates of 3 percent,
13 percent, and 25 percent in the three
groups.  These effects are substantially
larger than those found in the context of
401(k) matches.
The second broad conclusion is that,
along a number of dimensions, observed
taxpayer behavior is not consistent with
simple economic models that posit fully
informed and fully rational consumers.
First, take-up rates varied significantly
across different tax preparers.  Second,
the IRA take-up response to the
experimental match was significantly
larger than taxpayers’ responses to
equivalent changes in incentives
embodied in the existing Saver’s Credit.
Third, take-up rates were significantly
less than 100 percent even in the
presence of significant matches, which
suggests that clients were not attempting
to game the system by contributing to
the IRA and receiving the matching
contribution, and then cashing out the
accounts (with minimal penalties) as soon
as possible afterwards.  These findings
are consistent with a view that informa-
tion and simplicity affect saving choices.  
Taken together, the two sets of results
suggest that a combination of financial
incentives, tax preparer assistance, the
opportunity to use part of an income tax
refund to save, and easily accessible
saving vehicles could generate
substantial increases in both the efficacy
of federal tax incentives and the
willingness of households to contribute to
retirement saving accounts.
The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 describes the
experimental design and data. Section 3
analyzes the effects of the experiment.
Section 4 compares the results to
evidence from the Saver’s Credit.
Section 5 concludes.    
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Implementation, and Data
Tax Preparation at H&R Block
H&R Block is the largest tax preparer in
the United States. It currently prepares
over 16 million individual income tax
returns (about 12 percent of all individual
U.S. tax returns and about 23 percent of
tax returns prepared by paid
professionals) in 11,000 offices distributed
throughout the country. H&R employs
over 100,000 professional tax return
preparers during the tax season from
January to mid April.5
Clients come to an H&R Block office with
the documents, such as W-2 forms,
necessary for tax return preparation. They
sit at a desk with a tax professional while
the return is prepared. Both the tax
professional and the client sit in front of a
computer running the H&R Block Tax
Preparation Software (TPS). The desk
design is such that the clients typically
can read and follow the computer
screens as the tax professional works
through the tax preparation process.
TPS consists of a series of screens
corresponding to the various steps in tax
return preparation. At each screen, the
tax professional asks questions or inputs
information from the forms brought by the
client. By default, there is a natural
ordering of the screens called the “F10
sequence” (the name reflects the fact that
tax professionals move from one screen
to the next in the sequence using the F10
key). Using the computer mouse, tax
professionals can also skip ahead or
come back to any screen throughout the
tax preparation process. Many screens
are not accessed directly through the F10
sequence and appear only when they are
relevant (following an input or a particular
situation of the tax filer) or if the tax
professional uses the mouse to get to this
particular screen directly.   
The Express IRA Product
Since tax season 2001, H&R Block has
offered a product, called the express IRA
(X-IRA), to allow tax filers to make IRA
contributions at the time of tax
preparation. X-IRAs can be funded with a
personal check, a one-time direct
deposit, or the automatic allocation of
part or all of their federal tax refund to the
X-IRA (without the need to borrow against
the refund).  Most contributors fund their
X-IRA with part of their refund.  
In effect, through the X-IRA, H&R Block
offers all of its clients the “split refund”
option that has been advocated as a way
to significantly increase savings (see
Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano, 2004).
The logic for this option is that filers are
more likely to contribute to an IRA when
they have money available in the form of
a refund.  Indeed, for many low- and
middle-income families with children, the
federal tax refund is the largest single
payment they receive during the year.
Federal tax refunds represent over 10
percent of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
for tax filers with AGI below $50,000 in
the 60 offices where this experiment was
run.  Furthermore, opening or contributing
to an IRA at the time of tax return
preparation is easy and convenient. In
contrast, many low- and middle-income
families lack strong ties to banks and
other IRA providers, so that opening an
IRA outside of tax preparation could be
costly in terms of the psychological and
information requirements, as well as the
transaction fees charged.
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The custodian of the X-IRA account is
H&R Block Financial Advisors, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of H&R Block.  The
only investment option available within
the X-IRA product is a FDIC-insured
money market bank account offered by
The Reserve Funds.  The minimum
contribution is $300.6 There is a $15
set-up fee for opening an account or for
re-contributing to an existing account
using a portion of the refund at the time
of tax preparation. There is also an
annual account maintenance fee of $10,
which is waived for accounts with
balances over $1,000 or for those
participating in an automatic savings
plan.7  Once the balance in those
accounts reaches $1,000, individuals
may transfer assets from their X-IRA into
a new HRBFA IRA, which offers access
to a menu of investment options.
The X-IRA screen is normally not part of
the default F10 sequence, unless the
option has been deliberately selected by
the tax professional at the beginning of
the tax preparation session. Therefore,
the X-IRA will not be an option unless the
tax professional chooses to raise the
topic or clients asks about it.8 Clients
who are offered the X-IRA and decline
may change their mind later during the
tax preparation process (for example if
they obtain a larger tax refund than they
expected). It is easy for tax professionals
to come back to the X-IRA screen at any
point during the tax preparation and
change the inputs.  In practice,
substantial heterogeneity exists among
tax professionals in how effectively they
offer the X-IRA product.
The X-IRA product is well advertised to
tax professionals during pre-tax-season
training and to clients in the offices.
Many offices display posters that
describe the product and encourage
clients to think about their future and
save. H&R Block opened about 450,000
X-IRA accounts during tax seasons 2001
to 2004. In tax season 2004, the X-IRA
take-up rate (including opening and re-
contributions) was approximately 1.4
percent.
The existence of the X-IRA at H&R Block
provides an ideal tool to use to design
and build our experiment. H&R Block is
the only large tax preparer offering such a
product to such a broad low- and
middle-income client base.  
Experiment Design
The experiment was run in 60 H&R Block
offices in the St. Louis metro area in
Missouri and Illinois. The experiment ran
for 32 days, from March 5th to April 5th,
2005. During the first week from March 5
to March 11, the experiment ran in 45
offices. It was extended to 60 offices
starting March 12. Any client coming to
prepare his/her taxes at one of the
relevant offices during the experiment
was randomly assigned to one of three
groups: the control group, the 20 percent
match group, or the 50 percent match
group. Assignment was based on the
last two digits of the Social Security
number of the primary filer on the tax
return. The probability of assignment was
34 percent, 32 percent, and 34 percent
respectively.9
Each group received a waiver of the $15
X-IRA set-up fee.  The control group
received no match.  A second group
received a 20 percent match on X-IRA
contributions up to $1,000 (for a
maximum match of $200). A third group
received a 50 percent match on any X-
IRA contribution up to $1,000 (for a
maximum match of $500). X-IRA
accounts are individually owned, so the
same offer was extended to each spouse
for married tax filers filing jointly.  For
example, if a married couple filing jointly
was assigned to the 20 percent match
group, both the husband and the wife
could simultaneously open X-IRA
accounts, contribute to the limit, and
receive $200 each in matching
contributions, for a total family match of
$400. 
During the experiment, the Tax
Preparation Software (TPS) of H&R Block
was modified in the 60 experimental
offices along two important dimensions.
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the default F10 sequence. As a result,
any tax professional following the regular
F10 flow would hit the screen offering the
X-IRA product at some point during tax
preparation. However, through active use
of the mouse, it was possible for the tax
professional to avoid the X-IRA screen
altogether and never propose the
randomized X-IRA offer to the client. TPS
recorded which tax returns went through
the X-IRA screen.10  From now on, we
refer to those returns as having received
an “offer.” Obviously, if a filer was not
offered the X-IRA, the filer could not
contribute and benefit from the offer. The
important point is that the tax
professional’s decision to offer the X-IRA
was made before the treatment
assignment was revealed, since the tax
professionals were not aware of the
algorithm for assigning clients to each of
the randomized experimental groups and
the match rate was not revealed by the
software until after reaching this screen.11
Second, when the X-IRA screen was
activated, a special pop-up window
would automatically appear presenting
the offers corresponding to the treatment
group in which the client fell, and asking
whether the client wanted to contribute to
an X-IRA. The tax professionals were
instructed to read the text that appeared
in the pop-up window, but field
observations suggested that they did not
systematically adhere to the text and
instead presented the offer in a way that
they felt would be intuitive for the client. In
particular, while the window proposed
$500 as an example of a contribution
level and presented the associated
match, some tax professionals
undoubtedly presented other contribution
levels and the associated matches. To
move on, the tax professional was forced
to click “yes” or “no” on the pop-up
window. A “yes” click led the tax
professional to the standard X-IRA screen
where contributions and corresponding
matches would be manually inputted by
the tax professional. At the standard X-
IRA contribution screen, the client could
still decide not to contribute. A “no” click
on the pop-up window would skip the X-
IRA screen and move the tax preparation
to the next step. At any point, however,
the tax professional could come back to
the X-IRA screen and trigger the (same)
pop-up offer window and modify the
initial X-IRA contribution choice.
Matches to the X-IRA totaled roughly a
half million dollars and were funded by
H&R Block and deposited into the X-IRA
accounts of clients on April 15th. The
match was deposited only if the X-IRA
contributions had not been withdrawn
between tax preparation and April 15th.
After the match was deposited on April
15th, the account became a regular X-
IRA account and tax filers were
completely free to withdraw their
contribution and/or the match subject to
standard tax rules. In addition to any
regular income tax that may be owed,
traditional IRAs face a 10 percent penalty
for non-qualified withdrawals.  Roth IRAs
face a 10 percent penalty on interest (and
no penalty on the principal) for non-
qualified withdrawals.
About 600 tax professionals prepared tax
returns in the 60 experimental offices.
Those tax professionals were trained in
groups during simple one-hour training
sessions on March 1st and 2nd. The
training sessions were moderated in St.
Louis by Scott McBride (implementation
manager at H&R Block) and a member of
the research team (Emmanuel Saez).12
The training described the general goal of
the experiment, and explained all the
details of the TPS modification. Tax
professionals were instructed to follow the
F10 sequence and systematically go
through the X-IRA screen and to always
carefully read and explain to the tax filer
the offer on the pop-up window. Tax
professionals were also instructed to offer
a net worth survey at the end of the tax
preparation. Finally, tax professionals
were given the opportunity to ask
questions about the experiment.
Importantly, all tax professionals were
instructed to present the offers as
opportunities for retirement savings and
explicitly told not to tell tax filers that they
could “game the system” by making
contributions and then rescinding the
accounts immediately after the match7 may 2005
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was deposited on April 15th.13 All tax
professionals were provided with
abundant documentation about the
experiment: goal, implementation details,
and common questions and their
answers. Over 90 percent of tax
professionals working in the experimental
offices attended the training sessions. A
number of standard X-IRA refresher
training sessions were also offered to tax
professionals on a voluntary basis in early
March. H&R Block local management and
district and office managers made a
special effort to ensure that everyone
working in the experiment offices was
aware of the experiment and complying
with the experimental protocol.
Although training sessions were uniform,
tax professionals form a very
heterogeneous group, in terms of skills,
motivations, and interest in the X-IRA
product. Therefore, in practice, there was
significant heterogeneity in how tax
professionals would present the offer to
the clients and how convincingly they
made the case that those offers were a
beneficial opportunity.
Data
H&R Block supplied the data for this
analysis. H&R Block treats client privacy
with the utmost care and significant
safeguards were involved.  Throughout
the experiment, every measure was
undertaken to ensure that clients
understood the implications of their
participation.  All of the data were
stripped of any individual identifiers (such
as name, Social Security number, phone
numbers, addresses, office names, etc.)
before being provided to our research
team. The data include selected tax
return information collected during the tax
preparation process, information on X-IRA
contributions, selected additional
information collected by H&R Block
during the tax preparation process that
does not get recorded on tax forms, and
information about the tax professional
who prepared each sample member’s tax
return. These data are part of the
extensive data that H&R Block maintains
for its operations and is of extremely high
quality.  The data we use consist of all
clients in the 60 offices during the full tax
season from January 1st to April 15th.
(We use the non-experimental data from
before March 5th to compare the results
of our experiment to the Saver’s Credit.)  
In our analysis, we exclude filers with less
than $300 in earned income, since they
are not eligible to make the minimum X-
IRA contribution. All other filers may open
an X-IRA.14 We often divide filers into
“married” (specifically, married filing jointly)
and “non married” (including singles,
heads of households, and married filing
separately) categories.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays the means of several
variables for each of the three
experimental groups in the first three
columns and tests for whether the means
are statistically different across groups in
the next three columns. The t-statistics of
the difference is reported whenever it is
significant at the 5 percent level (i.e.,
when the t-statistic is above 1.96).
Because of randomization, 5 percent of
those differences should be statistically
significant. 
Only two variables, AGI and fraction
married, are significantly different (at the 5
percent level) between the treatment and
control groups. The overall AGI
differences are the result of the difference
in the proportion of married tax filers
between the treatment and control
groups (married taxpayers have higher
incomes on average than non-married
taxpayers).  There are no treatment-
control AGI differences among married
tax filers or among other tax filers.   The
proportion of married tax filers is slightly
higher in the matching groups (38.6
percent and 37.4 percent) than in the
control group (35.5 percent). Although
modest, those differences are statistically
significant.15
The average AGI in our sample ($43,000
in the control group) is similar to the
average AGI in the U.S. population. A little
less than half of the sample owns aThe Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean (Standard error) Significance of the
difference in means: t-stats
20% 50% 50% 
match match match
No 20%  50%  vs no vs 20% vs no
match match match match match match
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of returns  0.75 0.75 0.76
offered X-IRA  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
This tax pro made  0.005 0.004 0.005
no offer during experiment (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fraction of returns with X-IRA 0.023 0.022 0.023
by tax pro 01/01-03/04 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ajusted Gross income 42909 44789 44617 2.45 2.20
(plus Trad. IRA contributions) (523) (561) (575)
Ajusted Gross income,  67904 68487 69775
married taxpayers (filing jointly) (981) (943) (996)
Ajusted Gross income,  29168 29920 29579
non married taxpayers (438) (532) (540)
Fraction married, filling jointly 0.355 0.386 0.374 3.09 1.98
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Overpayment amount 1584 1570 1596
(26) (26) (26)
Fraction with overpayment  0.67 0.66 0.66
above $500 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
# Children dependent at home 0.53 0.54 0.53
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Fraction homeowners  0.45 0.42 0.44
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Fraction filed with H&R Block  0.63 0.63 0.64
in the preceding tax year (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Fraction EITC recipients 0.17 0.16 0.17
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Fraction with savings account 0.62 0.64 0.63
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
# of observations 4739 4617 4894
# of observations, married 1681 1780 1831
# of observations, others 3058 2837 3063
This table displays descriptive statistics for the three experimental groups (columns 1, 2, 3) and reports t-stats
when differences across groups are significant (columns 4 and 5). The sample is all experimental returns
eligible to contribute to an X-IRA.
Row 1 reports the fraction of offers defined as returns for which the X-IRA offer pop-up screen was reached.
This is a necessary step to contribute to an X-IRA.
Row 2 reports the average over tax pros of the fraction of returns for which an X-IRA was taken up among
returns completed by the tax pro before the experiment started. The average is taken over all individual
experimental returns in each group.
Adjusted gross income is always inclusive of all traditional IRA contributions (as X-IRA contributions are
affected by the experiment). Homeownership data are collected during tax preparation and not reported on
the tax return.9 may 2005
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house. Two-thirds have a federal refund
larger than $500, which would generally
allow them to fund a $300 X-IRA out of
their refund even if they owe taxes at the
state level. 
The experimental sample differs from the
large majority of H&R Block clients who
file early in the season. In St. Louis,
almost 79,000 H&R Block clients eligible
for an X-IRA filed before March 5, while
close to 15,000 filed between March 5
and April 5. Early filers are poorer (their
AGI averages $28,418), and less likely to
be married (only 21 percent are married
filing jointly).  Early filers are presumably
more impatient to receive their tax refund
and more likely to be liquidity constrained
than the population subject to this
experiment. Our results may therefore be
more representative of what would
happen in an average American
population than among the more
traditional H&R Block client base of early
filers.
The first row in Table 1, labeled “offer
rate,” shows the fraction of instances
where the pop-up screen appeared and
the tax professional had to record the
client’s answer in order to be able to
continue.  In each of the three groups,
the tax professionals presented the filer
with the relevant offer in 75 percent of the
cases.16  The second row shows that the
25 percent of cases where no offer was
made does not reflect a few tax
professionals who systematically avoided
the pop up screen.  Indeed, almost all
professionals displayed the screen at
some point. 
Figure 0 shows that learning occurred
during the experiment. The figure shows
how the offer rate varied by day: it
increased from 55 percent on March 12
to just below 80 percent around March
22, and stayed fairly constant after that
date. The increase early in the experiment
partly reflects H&R Block’s effort to get
professionals to systematically navigate
through the screens. The fact that the
offer rate does not vary significantly
across treatment groups suggests that
bypassing the offer was not based on the
tax professional’s guess as to which
match the tax filer would receive.  In other
words, the tax professionals do not
appear to have figured out the
randomization algorithm.  Because a tax
professional’s decision regarding whether
or not to navigate to the offer screen
could have been based on an
assessment of how likely the client was to
accept the offer, we do not analyze take-
up conditional on receiving an offer.
Instead, our analysis includes all tax filers
regardless of whether they were
presented with the offer screen (i.e., we
present “intent-to-treat” estimates), and
we allocate tax filers to the various
experimental groups based on the last
two digits of their Social Security number
(which is how the randomization
algorithm worked).  
Results
Take-up Rates and Contributions
Table 2 presents the main results of the
experiment. The table shows the X-IRA
take-up rates and contributions in the
three experimental groups. For
comparison, X-IRA take-up and
contributions in the period before the
beginning of the experiment are also
displayed.  The last three columns report
differences across the experimental
groups. Panel A reports statistics for allThe Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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Table 2: Effects of the experiment on X-IRA behavior
Mean (Standard error) Difference (standard errors)
20% 50% 50% 
match match match
No 20%  50%  vs no vs 20% vs no
Pre-experiment match match match match match match
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PANEL A: ALL TAXPAYERS
Opened an X-IRA (%) 2.15 3.31 9.64 17.00 6.33 7.36 13.69
(0.048) (0.260) (0.434) (0.537) (0.503) (0.695) (0.603)
Amount contributed ($) 8.8 28.4 123.4 222.8 95.1 99.4 194.4
(unconditional) (0.27) (3.74) (7.72) (9.36) (8.51) (12.21) (10.20)
Amount contributed ($) 381 856 1281 1310 424 30 454
(positive contributions only) (8.2) (91) (56) (36) (108) (64) (92)
Amount contributed, inclusive of match 28.4 143.0 318.2 114.6 175.2 289.8
(unconditional) (3.74) (8.68) (12.65) (9.37) (15.52) (13.38)
Amount contributed, inclusive of match 856 1484 1872 627 388 1015
(positive contributions only) (91) (60) (45) (115) (76) (111)
PANEL B: MARRIED TAXPAYERS ONLY
Opened an X-IRA (%) 1.69 2.91 13.48 24.90 10.57 11.42 21.99
(0.100) (0.410) (0.810) (1.011) (0.924) (1.300) (1.126)
Amount contributed ($) 9.6 45.2 232.3 433.9 187.1 201.6 388.8
(unconditional) (0.80) (9.32) (18.14) (22.33) (20.75) (28.86) (24.96)
Amount contributed ($) 470 1549 1723 1742 173 19 193
(positive contributions only) (30.2) (236) (86) (55) (218) (98) (185)
Amount contributed, inclusive of match 45.2 268.5 616.3 223.4 347.8 571.2
(unconditional) (9.32) (20.36) (29.94) (22.83) (36.40) (32.49)
Amount contributed, inclusive of match 1549 1992 2475 442 483 925
(positive contributions only) (236) (92) (66) (231) (113) (216)
Spouse opened an XIRA as well (%) 0.04 0.83 8.09 15.95 7.26 7.86 15.11
(0.015) (0.222) (0.646) (0.856) (0.699) (1.077) (0.918)
Amount contributed by spouse ($) 4.4 11.1 96.6 176.5 85.5 79.9 165.5
(1.83) (3.74) (9.29) (10.95) (10.22) (14.39) (11.97)
PANEL C: NON MARRIED TAXPAYERS ONLY
Opened an X-IRA (%) 2.25 3.53 7.23 12.28 3.69 5.05 8.74
(0.054) (0.334) (0.486) (0.593) (0.583) (0.774) (0.681)
Amount contributed ($) 8.7 19.1 55.1 96.6 36.0 41.5 77.4
(unconditional) (0.28) (2.70) (4.90) (5.61) (5.49) (7.50) (6.23)
Amount contributed ($) 364 542 763 787 221 24 245
(positive contributions only) (7.9) (57) (45) (25) (74) (48) (56)
Amount contributed, inclusive of match 19.1 64.3 140.0 45.1 75.7 120.9
(unconditional) (2.70) (5.53) (7.81) (6.02) (9.70) (8.27)
Amount contributed, inclusive of match 542 889 1140 347 251 599
(positive contributions only) (57) (48) (32) (78) (56) (67)
This table reports X-IRA statistics for the pre-experiment tax returns (before March 5) in column 1, and the three experimental groups
(no match in column 2, 20% match in column 3, 50% match in column 4) for all taxpayers with at least $300 in earned income (IRA
eligible). Columns 5, 6, and 7 report the differences across experiment groups.
Unconditional amounts report averages including zeros (those with no X-IRA contributions).
Married taxpayers defined as married filing jointly. Non-married taxpayers defined as all others (singles, head of households, and
married filing separately).11 may 2005
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tax filers, while the two remaining panels
break down the results according to
marital status.  
The first row of Panel A shows that
matching incentives have strong effects
on X-IRA take-up rates.  The take-up
rates are 3.3 percent, 9.6 percent and
17.0 percent respectively, in the no match,
20 percent match, and 50 percent match
groups. The take-up rate in the no match
group is quite low, and only one
percentage point higher than take-up
before the experiment started (2 percent).
This suggests that the combined option to
have set-up fees waived and to “split”
one’s refund — to allocate part of it to
retirement saving — is not in itself
sufficient to induce a large fraction of tax
filers to contribute to retirement accounts;
the results for the other groups suggest
that split refunds may be quite effective if
combined with stronger matches for
saving.17 The no-match results also
suggest that the propensity to save in the
population that was the subject of the
experiment is actually not much larger
than that of the population of early filers
(even with fee waivers), which ameliorates
to some extent the concern that the
experimental group is not representative
of the average H&R Block client.
The results in the first row show that the
match rate has a large effect on take-up,
and the differences between the matches
and between a match and no match are
strongly statistically significant (t-statistics
above 10).  The second row shows that
the effects on overall amounts
contributed are even stronger, since
contributions, conditional on take-up, are
higher in the two groups receiving the
match than in the control group (though
they are quite similar across the two
match groups).  Not surprisingly, when
the matching contributions are added, the
differences grow even larger:
unconditional X-IRA deposits (including
the match) for the three groups are
respectively $28, $143, and $318.  IRA
deposits are 5 times larger with a 20
percent match than with no match, and
11 times larger with a 50 percent match
than with no match. 
The significant difference in take-up rates
between the 20 percent and 50 percent
match groups indicates that the level of
the match rate, and not only the fact that
there is one, influences take-up. The
elasticity of the take-up rate with respect
to (1+match rate), defined as the change
in the natural log of the take-up rate
divided by the change in the natural log
of (1+match rate) are respectively 5.87 for
the 20 percent match rate and 4 for the
50 percent match rate.18 Although the
elasticity is higher for low match rates, it
remains high even for larger match rates.
The fact that tax filers respond to the level
of the match suggests that the response
is a reasoned calculation, and not simply
a case where the match attracted their
attention to the existence of the X-IRA
(Bernheim, 2003). 
The effects of the match on take-up rates
for married tax returns are about twice as
large as they are for others.19 Take-up
rates are 2.9 percent, 13.5 percent, and
25 percent for married filers in the three
groups, respectively, compared to 3.5
percent, 7.2 percent, and 12.3 percent
for other filers.  Interestingly, married and
other tax filers have about the same
likelihood of opening an X-IRA without a
match. The effects on amounts
contributed are also correspondingly
much larger for married tax filers than for
others. For married filers, the average
unconditional contributions inclusive of
match are respectively $45, $269 and
$616 in the three groups, and are roughly
four times as large as contributions for
other taxpayers in the 20 percent and 50
percent match groups. The bottom of
Panel B shows that take-up rates for a
second X-IRA for married filers are 1
percent, 8 percent, and 16 percent for
the three groups. This shows that match
rates also generate a large response on
the spousal (or secondary) X-IRA
contribution decision for couples.20
The cumulative distribution of X-IRA
contributions (excluding the matching
amounts) is shown in Figure 1A for
married filers and Figure 1B for other
filers. Each graph reports the fraction ofThe Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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tax filers contributing less than a given
amount for any level of contributions (on
the x-axis). The figures show that, for any
contribution level, the fraction of filers
contributing at least that amount is
always higher for the 50 percent match
group than for the 20 percent match
group, and higher for the 20 percent
match group than for the no match
group. The figures also show that
contributions tend to be clustered at
discrete amounts such as $300 (the
minimum contribution) and $1,000 (the
maximum contribution eligible for the
match). For married tax filers, bunching
also occurs at $600 and $2,000 because
both spouses may contribute.  There is
also some bunching at $500 for the
match groups (and much less so for the
no match group). This bunching may
reflect the fact that the example given on
the X-IRA offer pop-up window for the
match group was based on a $500
contribution example, which could have
created a focal point.  We plan to explore
these types of focal effects further in
future work.
Above the match cap ($2,000 for
married, $1,000 for single), the match
provides only an income effect, with no
substitution effect. Standard theory would
therefore predict that the match should
reduce contributions above the match
cap, and we should see the distributions
crossing at that point. This prediction is
not what we observe in the data: the
fraction of filers contributing in excess of
$1,000 (for non married) and $2,000 (for
married) remains higher for the match
groups than for the control group.  
Figure 0 shows the take-up rates in the
three experimental groups as a function of
the date at which the return was filed. The
take up of the X-IRA with no match did
not increase over time; if anything, it may
have been slightly declining. The take-up
rate in both the 20 percent group and the
50 percent group increased over time,
and increased much faster in the 50
percent group. While the increase in take-
up between March 5 and March 22 could
potentially be due to the corresponding
increase in the offer rate, the take-up rate
continued to increase at the same speed
afterwards, suggesting that, in practice,
the increase in offer rates is likely not
responsible for the increase in take-up
rates. It could be that tax professionals
became better at presenting the product,
or that clients who filed later in the season
were more savvy or less cash
constrained. The effect does not,
however, appear to be due to a different
propensity to save, since the take-up in
the no match group did not rise over time. 
Who took up the match? 
The welfare and policy implications of
savings incentives depend in part on who
is most likely to use them. Of particular
interest is the response of poorer
households, where much of the policy
concern is focused.  Table 3 presents the
average X-IRA take-up rates and13 may 2005
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Table 3: Effects on X-IRA behavior by income quartiles
Mean (Standard error) Difference (standard errors)
20% 50% 50% 
match match match
No 20%  50%  vs no vs 20% vs no
match match match match match match
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. MARRIED TAXPAYERS
A.1 Bottom quartile ($0-$35,000)
Opened an XIRA 3.46 11.44 17.21 7.98 5.77 13.75
(1.026) (1.822) (2.059) (2.071) (2.772) (2.343)
Amount contributed 26.1 174.4 235.3 148.3 60.9 209.2
(unconditional) (12.18) (41.09) (32.45) (42.18) (51.89) (35.44)
# observations 318 306 337
A.2 Second quartile ($35,000-$58,300)
Opened an XIRA 4.32 14.66 25.39 10.34 10.73 21.08
(0.996) (1.656) (2.066) (1.978) (2.641) (2.342)
Amount contributed 109.2 249.3 343.2 140.2 93.9 234.1
(unconditional) (32.78) (38.82) (32.56) (51.31) (50.79) (46.24)
# observations 417 457 445
A.3 Third quartile ($58,300-$88,200)
Opened an XIRA 2.60 12.61 25.13 10.01 12.52 22.53
(0.686) (1.381) (1.814) (1.577) (2.276) (1.985)
Amount contributed 28.2 215.8 424.2 187.6 208.4 396.0
(unconditional) (9.75) (29.97) (38.77) (32.45) (48.93) (41.08)
# observations 539 579 573
A.4 Fourth quartile ($88,200+)
Opened an XIRA 1.47 14.84 29.62 13.37 14.78 28.15
(0.598) (1.701) (2.095) (1.856) (2.726) (2.332)
Amount contributed 17.0 276.8 671.0 259.9 394.2 654.1
(unconditional) (9.25) (37.42) (59.69) (39.83) (71.84) (65.12)
# observations 407 438 476
B. NON MARRIED TAXPAYERS
B.1 Bottom quartile ($0-$8,500)
Opened an XIRA 1.90 2.82 4.67 0.92 1.85 2.77
(0.596) (0.743) (0.895) (0.947) (1.179) (1.088)
Amount contributed 8.0 18.3 32.3 10.3 13.9 24.3
(unconditional) (2.80) (6.15) (6.82) (6.64) (9.27) (7.53)
# observations 526 497 557
B.2 Second quartile ($8,500-$18,400)
Opened an XIRA 2.93 7.39 8.67 4.46 1.29 5.75
(0.662) (1.111) (1.140) (1.253) (1.597) (1.299)
Amount contributed 12.9 40.6 50.9 27.7 10.3 38.0
(unconditional) (3.29) (7.42) (7.67) (7.73) (10.71) (8.17)
# observations 649 555 611
B.3 Third quartile ($18,400-$32,500)
Opened an XIRA 5.03 6.57 14.14 1.54 7.58 9.12
(0.785) (0.917) (1.239) (1.202) (1.562) (1.473)
Amount contributed 34.6 49.1 101.5 14.6 52.3 66.9
(unconditional) (8.66) (9.46) (11.03) (12.80) (14.64) (14.06)
# observations 776 731 792
B.4 Fourth quartile ($32,500+)
Opened an XIRA 3.61 9.68 16.77 6.06 7.10 13.16
(0.561) (0.911) (1.125) (1.059) (1.456) (1.256)
Amount contributed 17.2 84.2 150.9 67.0 66.6 133.6
(unconditional) (3.61) (10.30) (12.03) (10.71) (15.90) (12.54)
# observations 1107 1054 1103
Groups are defined by quartiles of AGI inclusive of IRA contributions. Those quartiles are defined from the universe of all individual US tax returns (with at least
$300 in earned income) from the Statistics of Income microfiles for year 2000 (adjusted for income growth to 2004) for married filing jointly and all other filers
separately.The Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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contributions by marital status and by
quartiles of AGI (to which we have added
the traditional IRA contributions, since
such contributions are subtracted when
computing AGI). Each tax unit was
assigned to its position in the full
distribution of tax filers in the United
States estimated from the Internal
Revenue Service Statistics of Income file
for the year 2000.21
For married filers, the effect of the match
is significant in all income quartiles,
although it does increase with income:
Relative to the no match group, the take-
up rate was 14 percentage points higher
in the 50 percent match group in the first
quartile, 21 points in the second quartile,
23 points in the third quartile, and 28
points in the top quartile. For other filers,
the effect increases faster with income,
and is somewhat less striking in the lower
income quartiles. Relative to the control
group, the effect of the 50 percent match
on X-IRA take-up is respectively 3, 6, 9,
and 13 percentage points in the first
through fourth quartiles. The effect of the
50 percent match rate remains significant
even in the bottom quartile. The
difference in take-up rates between the
20 percent match rate and the no match
group is not statistically significant in the
bottom quartile, but the difference in
contributions remains significant at the 10
percent level in this group.
Table 4 explores the effects of the match
on two specific sub-samples: those
Table 4: Effects on X-IRA behavior by EITC status and savings account ownership
Mean (Standard error) Difference (standard errors)
20% 50% 50% 
match match match
No 20%  50%  vs no vs 20% vs no
match match match match match match
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. EITC Status
A.1 No EITC
Opened an XIRA 2.89 9.82 17.64 6.94 7.82 14.75
(0.268) (0.478) (0.598) (0.546) (0.770) (0.663)
Amount contributed 26.9 135.6 249.8 108.6 114.2 222.9
(unconditional) (4.23) (9.01) (11.03) (9.93) (14.32) (11.98)
# observations 3914 3879 4070
A.2 EITC Recipients
Opened an XIRA 5.33 8.67 13.83 3.34 5.16 8.50
(0.783) (1.037) (1.204) (1.283) (1.606) (1.435)
Amount contributed 35.2 59.5 89.2 24.4 29.7 54.1
(unconditional) (7.72) (9.05) (9.79) (11.83) (13.43) (12.46)
# observations 825 738 824
B. Savings Account Ownership
B.1. No Savings Account
Opened an XIRA 2.30 5.88 9.80 3.58 3.91 7.49
(0.355) (0.574) (0.698) (0.667) (0.911) (0.788)
Amount contributed 20.3 57.6 105.4 37.3 47.8 85.0
(unconditional) (6.19) (7.90) (10.49) (9.98) (13.29) (12.24)
# observations 1781 1683 1817
B.2 Savings Account owners
Opened an XIRA 3.92 11.79 21.25 7.87 9.46 17.33
(0.357) (0.596) (0.738) (0.693) (0.953) (0.830)
Amount contributed 33.2 161.2 292.1 128.0 131.0 258.9
(unconditional) (4.69) (11.21) (13.38) (12.12) (17.54) (14.40)
# observations 2958 2934 3077
Groups are defined by EITC recipiency status and whether taxpayers own a savings account. 15 may 2005
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Table 5: OLS regression: determinants of X-IRA take up and treatment effects
X-IRA take up rate (percentage)
Married taxpayers Non-married taxpayers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
20% match dummy 10.57 10.57 4.01 3.69 3.68 0.03
(1.14) (1.14) (4.39) (.69) (.68) (2.44)
50% match dummy 21.99 21.92 7.53 8.74 8.87 4.21
(1.14) (1.13) (4.38) (.67) (.67) (2.39)
Second AGI quartile 3.92 0.80 1.39 0.12
(1.44) (2.53) (.91) (1.54)
Third AGI quartile 1.82 -1.19 2.95 1.97
(1.40) (2.46) (.89) (1.54)
Fourth AGI quartile 3.92 -2.23 3.29 0.31
(1.51) (2.67) (.90) (1.56)
Number of Dependents -0.21 -0.28 1.83 1.05
(.44) (.81) (.42) (.69)
Home ownership dummy -2.96 -1.02 -0.76 1.09
(1.38) (2.42) (.63) (1.08)
Repeat customer dummy 0.31 1.01 1.35 1.19
(1.06) (1.92) (.58) (.99)
Positive refund dummy 4.72 1.88 5.13 3.71
(1.04) (1.84) (.62) (1.05)
Bank account dummy 4.88 1.28 3.91 1.90
(1.12) (1.99) (.58) (.99)
Second AGI quartile * 1.83 2.74
20% match (3.55) (2.24)
Third AGI quartile * 1.04 -0.32
20% match (3.45) (2.20)
Fourth AGI quartile * 4.53 3.80
20% match (3.74) (2.23)
Second AGI quartile * 7.25 1.00
50% match (3.52) (2.18)
Third AGI quartile * 7.63 3.19
50% match (3.41) (2.14)
Fourth AGI quartile * 12.99 5.06
50% match (3.68) (2.18)
Number of dependents * 0.96 0.85
20% match (1.11) (1.03)
Number of dependents * -0.64 1.65
50% match (1.10) (1.01)
Home ownership * -3.56 -0.41
20% match (3.38) (1.56)
Home ownership * -2.27 -5.17
50% match (3.39) (1.54)
Repeat Customer * -2.52 -0.69
20% match (2.63) (1.43)
Repeat Customer * 0.48 1.01
50% match (2.64) (1.40)
Positive refund * 5.08 1.61
20% match (2.57) (1.52)
Positive refund * 3.32 2.59
50% match (2.54) (1.49)
Savings account * 3.60 2.05
20% match (2.73) (1.43)
Savings account * 6.81 3.91
50% match (2.77) (1.40)
This table reports OLS coefficients of the regression of an X-IRA take up dummy (normalized to 100)
on treatment groups dummies, covariates, and covariates interacted with treatment dummies.
The positive refund dummy represents taxpayers with a federal income tax refund larger than $500.The Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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receiving the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) and those with a savings account.
As Table 1 shows, about 17 percent of
the sample overall receives the EITC and
about 63 percent has a savings account.
Both of these variables are correlated
with income.  Given the results in Table 3,
it is therefore not surprising that Table 4
shows that the difference in take-up rates
and in contributions across the match
rates is more modest for EITC recipients
than for non-EITC recipients, and is
stronger for those with savings accounts
than those without such accounts.  For
example, the take-up rate for the 50
percent match group is 8.5 percentage
points higher than the control group for
EITC recipients, and 7.5 percentage
points higher for those not owning a
savings account.  By contrast, the
differential take-up rate among non-EITC
recipients and those owning a savings
account is 14.8 percentage points and
17.3 percentage points respectively.
Nonetheless, the increases for EITC
recipients and those not owning a
savings account still remain statistically
significant and meaningful for both match
rates.  
Table 5 uses OLS regressions to
summarize these patterns and compare
the effect sizes across different groups.
Column 1 for married filers — and column
4 for singles and heads of household —
simply reproduces the results in Table 3:
the coefficient of the “20 percent (50
percent) match dummy” is the difference
between the take-up rate in the 20
percent (50 percent) match and that in
the “no match” group. Columns 2 and 5
show that these results are not affected
by controlling for income, number of
dependents, home ownership status,
whether or not the tax filer is an H&R
Block repeat customer, and savings
account ownership. This is not surprising,
since the treatment was randomly
assigned and the sample is large. 
Columns 3 and 6 investigate whether the
effect of the treatment varies according to
these characteristics. The coefficient of
1.61 for the variable “second AGI quartile
20 percent match” for married tax filers
tells us, for example, that the effect of the
20 percent match (relative to no match)
increases take-up by 1.61 percentage
points for tax filers in the second quartile,
compared to tax filers in the first quartile
(and the standard errors lead us to
conclude that this difference is not
significant). This table confirms the
pattern shown in Table 3: the effects of
the 50 percent match are significantly
larger for higher income tax filers for both
married and single tax filers.  This
income-related pattern is not
systematically the case for the 20 percent
match.  The savings account dummy
interacted with treatment groups
dummies in Table 5 is statistically
significant showing that savings account
ownership has a positive effect on the
response to matches (especially for the
50 percent match) even controlling for
income.
Among the other variables included in this
table (homeownership, number of
dependents, being a repeat H&R block
customer, repeat customer status refund
amount), only the refund amount has
some impact on X-IRA take-up. Married
tax filers are respectively 5 and 3.5
percentage points more likely to take-up
an X-IRA in the 20 percent and 50
percent match groups if their federal
refund is larger than $500 than if it is
smaller than $500. But these effects are
not very large, and even in the group of
people who have a refund larger than
$500, the take-up is far below 100
percent. This suggests that credit
constraints alone cannot explain why less
than 100 percent of H&R clients took
advantage of the match rate (thereby
failing to capture the potential “free
lunch”).
Tax Professional Effects
Field observations suggested that the
way a tax professional presents the
program to the tax filer is likely to have an
important effect on the client’s response.
Tax professionals clearly exerted different
amounts of effort and enthusiasm in17 may 2005
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presenting the product to the client and
their understanding of the program was
also heterogeneous.  
One dimension of heterogeneity is the tax
professional’s prior experience with X-
IRAs. To investigate this issue, we first
divided tax professionals according to
their experience with X-IRAs before the
beginning of the experiment (Table 6).
In each panel (married or single), the
first sub-panel displays the average take-
up rates and amounts contributed for
clients whose tax professional had less
than the median fraction of X-IRA take-up
before the beginning of the experiment
(1.5 percent), whom we label “low
experience tax professionals”;22 the
second panel shows the results for clients
whose tax professionals had more take-
up than the median, whom we label “high
experience tax professionals.”
Unsurprisingly, for both married and
singles, the take-up in the “no match
group” is higher among clients working
with a “high experience tax professional,”
although the difference is small. More
important, the effect of the match rate (20
percent or 50 percent) is larger for filers
working with tax professionals who have
relatively higher X-IRA take-up rates
before: for married filers for example, the
effect of a 20 percent match rate on take-
up increases from 7 percent to 12
percent when moving from a “below
median experience tax professional” to an
“above median experience tax
professional,” and the effect of a 50
percent match rate increases from 18
percent to 25 percent. 
Table 6: Effects on X-IRA by tax pro previous X-IRA experience
Mean (Standard error) Difference (standard errors)
20% 50% 50% 
match match match
No 20%  50%  vs no vs 20% vs no
match match match match match match
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. MARRIED TAXPAYERS
A.1 Below median
Opened an X-IRA 2.56 9.90 20.23 7.34 10.33 17.66
(0.506) (0.940) (1.238) (1.079) (1.564) (1.376)
Amount contributed 23.0 161.3 324.8 138.3 163.4 301.8
(unconditional) (6.16) (19.81) (22.57) (21.05) (30.12) (24.19)
A.2 Above median
Opened an X-IRA 3.43 15.85 28.29 12.43 12.43 24.86
(0.561) (1.088) (1.329) (1.251) (1.721) (1.490)
Amount contributed 63.1 269.6 493.0 206.5 223.4 429.9
(unconditional) (14.54) (24.42) (30.88) (28.94) (39.45) (35.16)
B. NON-MARRIED TAXPAYERS
B.1 Below median
Opened an X-IRA 2.20 4.26 8.96 2.06 4.70 6.76
(0.344) (0.495) (0.668) (0.594) (0.844) (0.752)
Amount contributed 10.3 33.0 72.0 22.7 39.0 61.7
(unconditional) (2.32) (4.91) (6.28) (5.28) (8.08) (6.71)
B.1 Above median
Opened an X-IRA 4.53 9.04 13.70 4.50 4.66 9.16
(0.486) (0.697) (0.807) (0.840) (1.073) (0.940)
Amount contributed 25.3 68.0 103.8 42.8 35.8 78.6
(unconditional) (4.00) (7.02) (7.44) (7.93) (10.26) (8.43)
This table divides the sample by tax professionals according to the fraction of returns with an X-IRA among all the returns they completed before the experiment.The Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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These results could reflect differences in
the tax professional’s attitudes and skills,
but they may also reflect differences in
the mix of clients working with different
tax professionals. For example, clients
who live in richer neighborhoods may be
more likely to respond to the match rate
(the discussion on the previous page
underscores that take-up increased with
income) and also to take-up X-IRAs in the
absence of any special program. This
would induce a correlation between the
X-IRA take-up rates across tax
professionals in the offices in these areas
before the experiment and take-up of the
incentives when the experiment started. 
To investigate this further, we regress, in
the first panel of Table 7, the take-up of
X-IRAs on dummy variables for the two
Table 7: OLS Regressions: Tax pro effects on X-IRA take up
Married Non Married
All New All New
customers customers customers customers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. TAX PRO X-IRA CLIENT TAKE-UP RATES BEFORE MARCH 5, 2005
20% match 6.50 6.71 2.44 2.18
(3.43) (5.70) (1.97) (2.72)
50% match 10.82 19.28 7.93 3.26
(3.33) (5.95) (1.93) (2.80)
Tax pro above median # of IRAs taken up 0.17 1.93 2.53 1.09
before March 5, 2005 (1.70) (3.40) (.99) (1.33)
Tax pro above median  6.56 9.72 2.36 1.63
* 20% match (2.25) (4.40) (1.36) (1.82)
Tax pro above median  9.42 -0.26 2.82 3.99
* 50% match (2.23) (4.44) (1.33) (1.80)
B. TAX PRO X-IRA CLIENT TAKE-UP RATES DURING THE EXPERIMENT
20% match 3.09 3.78 1.09 2.42
(2.86) (5.56) (1.66) (2.65)
50% match 2.29 5.87 4.68 1.98
(3.26) (5.76) (1.84) (2.76)
Tax pro above median in fraction with 1.24 -0.66 1.82 2.27
X-IRA take-up during the experiment (1.31) (3.22) (1.00) (1.32)
Tax pro above median  14.16 16.66 5.32 2.05
* 20% match (2.20) (4.27) (1.36) (1.83)
Tax pro above median  26.49 28.25 8.58 7.02
* 50% match (2.85) (4.31) (1.67) (1.79)
C. FRACTION OF 50% AND 20% MATCH RECEIVED BY THE TAX PRO
20% match 7.63 7.69 3.06 2.20
(3.38) (5.63) (1.95) (2.69)
50% match 12.00 15.42 8.78 4.42
(3.28) (5.70) (1.90) (2.74)
Tax pro received more than median -0.71 -2.77 -0.91 -1.33
high offers (1.69) (3.44) (1.01) (1.34)
Tax pro above median  4.20 7.22 1.22 1.86
*20% match (2.28) (4.49) (1.39) (1.87)
Tax pro above median  6.41 9.52 1.22 2.26
*50% match (2.27) (4.57) (1.36) (1.83)
Observations 5292 1380 8958 3827
Tax pros 651 493 723 662
X-IRA dummy (normalized to 100) is regressed on treatment dummies, tax pro experience dummy with X-IRAs and tax pro
dummy interacted with treatment dummies.
All regressions control for all individual variables in table 5, and all the variables interacted with the two match rate dummies;
they also controls for a dummies indicating the office location.
In Panel A, the tax pro experience dummy is equal to one if the tax pro is above median in the fraction of returns with X-IRA
taken up before the experiment.
In Panel B, the tax pro experience dummy is equal to one if the tax pro is above median in the fraction of returns with X-
IRAs taken up during the experiment (excluding current return observation).
In Panel C, the tax pro experience dummy is equal to one if the tax pro is above median in the fraction of returns with a
match offer (20% or 50%) during the experiment (irrespective of whether offer is made).19 may 2005
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match rates, a dummy variable for
whether or not the tax professional had
more than the median number of X-IRAs
taken-up by clients before the beginning
of the experiment, and the interaction of
this dummy variable with the two match
rates. In addition, we control for a full set
of dummies for the office in which the tax
pro works (60 office dummies), as well as
all the individual variables included in
Table 4, and their interaction with the
treatment dummies.23 The coefficient of
the interaction “tax pro above median 20
percent match” is therefore equal to the
difference between the effect of the 20
percent match (column 4) in panel 1 and
panel 2 of Table 6, adjusted for the
possible effects of the control variables.
For married tax filers, the effect of the 20
percent and the 50 percent match are
both larger when they work with a tax
professional who had higher X-IRA take
up before the experiment started. For
example, for married filers receiving the
20 percent match, being served by a low
experience tax professional increases
X-IRA take-up by 6.50 percentage points
relative to no match. Being served by a
high experience tax professional
increases X-IRA take-up rate by a
further 6.56 percentage points. Therefore,
receiving a 20 percent match and
being served by a high experience tax
pro increased the take-up rate by 13.06
percentage points relative to no match
and being served by a low experience
tax professional. This shows that a high
experience tax professional doubles the
effect of the 20 percent match. The
effects are similar for the 50 percent
match for married taxpayers. For non-
married tax filers, the corresponding
effects are positive as well, but smaller
and not significant at the 95 percent level. 
The difference thus persists even when
controlling for observable characteristics
of the tax filer that affect take-up. To
attempt to control for unobserved
characteristics, we restrict the sample to
new tax filers, since repeat tax filers may
choose a tax professional they particularly
like. In contrast, new tax filers are often
assigned to the next available tax
professional, so that within an office, the
assignment of a tax filer to a particular tax
professional should be close to random.24
The drawback is that this sub-sample is
much smaller. The results nonetheless
persist in this sub-sample, except for the
interaction between the high experience
tax professional and the 50 percent
match, which disappears. On balance,
these results seem to indicate that the
identity of the tax professional and his/her
previous experience does matter for the
take up of the incentives. 
Panel B in Table 7 investigates this
result further by using the tax pro’s
performance in offering X-IRAs during
the experiment, rather than before.
Because there is a mechanical correlation
between take-up of a particular individual
and the mean X-IRA take-up for a tax
pro, we first compute for each tax filer
the fraction of the other returns prepared
by the same tax pro during the
experiment with X-IRA take-up. We
then assign a dummy equal to one for
“high experience tax pro,” when this
fraction is above the median (5.4
percent), and we run the same
specification as in panel A. 
The results are quite striking: almost the
entire treatment effect appears to be due
to tax pros with relatively high X-IRA take-
up rates.  When a tax filer is matched
with a tax pro who, in the course of the
experiment, had relatively fewer X-IRAs
taken up by other tax filers, she appears
to be completely unresponsive to the
match incentives. For example, the effect
of the 50 percent match rate (relative to
no match) is only 2.29 percentage points
for married taxpayers served by a lower
experience tax pro. Conversely, the
treatment effects are quite large for those
who were assigned to a tax-pro with take
up of more than 5.4 percent of the other
returns during the duration of the
experiment; for married tax filers, the
effect of the 50 percent match in this
population is 29 percentage points
(26.49+2.29), and the effect of the 20
percent match is 17 percentage points
(14.16+3.09). This is an indication that
there are very strong tax professional
effects.25The Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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The result is robust to adding control
variables, as well as to restricting the
sample to only new customers, a set
within which the assignment is unlikely to
be related to the propensity to take up
the X-IRA (if anything, the effects are even
slightly larger in this sample). However, in
both panel A and panel B, a concern
could remain that the correlation with
prior or current tax-professional behavior
does not indicate a causal effect. The
most robust evidence of a tax
professional effect would be obtained if
we could randomly assign different levels
of training or exposure to the product to a
tax professional. It turns out that our
experiment generates something akin to
this ideal set-up: since most tax
professionals did not prepare a very large
number of returns during the
experimental period, the tax filer
randomization into the three experimental
groups generated random variation in the
level of exposure to one of the match
groups for each tax professional.  For
some tax pros, very few of their clients
received the 20 percent match or 50
percent match offer, while for other tax
pros, many more did. A tax pro who had
many of the matched offers among his
clients acquired more experience in
dealing with the X-IRA (since his clients
were more likely to open an X-IRA or at
least discuss this option seriously) and
may therefore have been more likely to
encourage his other clients to do this. 
We therefore construct a dummy equal to
one if the tax pro received more than the
median proportion of either 20 percent or
50 percent match offers (i.e., less than 33
percent “no match”), and run regressions
using the same specification as in panels
A and B.26  Married tax filers served by
tax professionals whose caseload
included many match offers are no more
likely to take up an X-IRA when there is
no treatment, but their treatment effect for
the 20 percent and 50 percent matches
are significantly larger than if they had a
tax professional whose caseload included
less than the median fraction of matches.
This is very robust evidence of the role of
the tax professional in influencing the
response to the match rates because
assignment is fully random.
These results therefore suggest that, in
contrast to the standard model of
decision making, individual preferences
about savings can be shaped or affected
by external cues such as the
recommendation of tax preparers. These
findings are in line with the recent findings
in the behavioral economics literature
showing that non-standard features such
as default options (Madrian and Shea,
2001) or soft commitments (Thaler and
Benartzi, 2004) can have a substantial
impact on retirement contributions
decisions. Our results show that the
responsiveness of both participation and
contributions to incentives can be
affected by such external influences. 
Cashing Out Contributions
An important question is whether the
extra X-IRA contributions due to matching
incentives will translate into higher net
worth or are simply substitutes for other
forms of wealth.27 A first step is to
analyze whether X-IRA contributions are
withdrawn or whether they stay in the
accounts.28 The matching contributions
were deposited in the X-IRA accounts on
April 15th. As of May 2nd, only 18 of the
1,500 X-IRA accounts opened during the
experiment had experienced any
withdrawals. If withdrawals continue to be
negligible, the results will represent a
challenge to the fully rational model (in
which all individuals would take
advantage of the match in order to cash
out distributions as soon as possible).
Furthermore, the fraction of contributors
using Roth IRAs rather than traditional
IRAs was 54 percent in the control group,
60 percent in the 20 percent match
group, and 60 percent in the 50 percent
match group.  Since early withdrawal tax
penalties are less severe for Roth IRAs
(the 10 percent early withdrawal penalty
does not apply to withdrawals of principal
from a Roth IRA), those wanting to game
the system and pull the match out as
soon as possible would be attracted to
the Roth rather than the traditional IRA.21 may 2005
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The fact that Roth IRAs are only slightly
more prevalent in the 20 percent and 50
percent match groups compared to the
control group provides further suggestive
evidence that gaming was not a
significant factor in the results.  In any
case, it will clearly be critical to continue
monitoring withdrawals and new
contributions in the future.
Comparison with the 
Saver’s Credit
The Saver’s Credit Program
In this section, we compare the effects
reported above to those created by the
Saver’s Credit, which provides similar
matching incentives for low- and middle-
income tax filers. Because the nature and
magnitude of the formal economic
incentives in the experiment described
above have some similarities to those in
the Saver’s Credit, the existence of
substantial differences in their effects
would suggest strongly that information,
tax professional assistance, and simplicity
can play key roles in encouraging low-
and middle-income households to make
contributions to retirement savings
accounts. 
The Saver’s Credit was implemented in
tax year 2002 (tax returns filed in early
2003) and is scheduled to expire after
2006 (tax returns filed in early 2007).  The
Saver’s Credit is a non-refundable tax
credit on the first $2,000 (for each spouse)
contributed to IRAs (Roth and Traditional)
or voluntary pension plans (Keogh, 401(k),
403(b), SIMPLE IRA, etc.).29 As shown in
Table 8, the credit rate decreases with AGI
and is zero above an AGI threshold that
depends on filing status.  The credit rate is
50 percent at the bottom, 20 percent in a
narrow AGI band, and then 10 percent for
a relatively broad range.  A credit at rate t
is economically equivalent to a match rate
of t/(1-t) so that the effective match rates
generated by the Saver’s Credit are
Table 8: Saver's Credit Parameters
Married Filing Jointly Head of Household Single and others
Credit Rate Equivalent
Match Rate AGI range AGI range AGI range
t t/(1-t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
50% 100% $0-$30,000 $0-$22,500 $0-$15,000
20% 25% $30,001-$32,500 $22,501-$24,375 $15,001-$16,250
10% 11.1% $32,501-$50,000 $24,376-$37,500 $16,251-$22,500
0% 0% $50,001+ $37,501+ $22,501+
Notes: The Saver's Credit is a non-refundable federal income tax credit proportional to the sum of all elective retirement
contributions (all IRAs, 401(k)s, etc.) up to $2,000 of contributions ($2,000 for each spouse for married taxpayers).
Full time students, individuals claimed as dependents by other taxpayers, and individuals aged under 18 are not eligible.
Early withdrawals (within the last three years) are netted out of annual retirement contributions to estimate eligible
contributions.
As shown in the columns (3) to (5), the credit rate varies by AGI range and marital status. The bracket length for heads of
household and singles are 75% and 50% of the bracket length for joint filers, respectively. A credit rate of t (col. (1)) is
equivalent to a match rate of t/(1-t) (col. (2)).
AGI used to compute the credit rate t is net of most retirement contributions with the exception of Roth IRAs and is
endogenous.
The Saver's Credit is non refundable and can be used only to offset tax liability net of other non refundable credits.
As a result, the Saver's Credit is independent of the EITC but interacts with the partially refundable child tax credit.
See IRS Form 8880 and IRS Publication 590 for more details.The Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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actually 100 percent, 25 percent, and
11.1 percent. For example, a tax filer
facing the 50 percent credit rate and
contributing $1,000 would receive a $500
tax credit, so that its out-of-pocket cost
for a $1,000 contribution is only $500,
which is effectively a 100 percent match
rate. Therefore, the Saver’s Credit could
potentially generate very large incentives
for contributing. 
Because the Saver’s Credit is non-
refundable, many low income tax filers
who would qualify for the highest credit
rate on the basis of their AGI benefit from
it only to a very limited extent or even not
at all, because they have little or no tax
liability due to standard or itemized
deductions, personal exemptions, and
use of other non-refundable credits (in
particular, the child tax credit).30
Furthermore, about 20 percent of tax
filers showing a positive Saver’s Credit on
their 1040 tax form actually do not benefit
from it, on net, because the Saver’s
Credit crowds out the Child Tax Credit
one for one. The data allow us to define
precisely whether a tax filer benefits or
could potentially benefit from the Saver’s
Credit.31 In what follows, we call those
filers who are or could be benefiting
“eligible” filers. Those who do not or
could not benefit are called “ineligible.”
At first glance, comparing pension
contributions on each side of the AGI
boundary points defining the credit rate
brackets might seem like a promising way
to analyze the effects of the credit (or
match equivalent) rates, since there is a
discontinuity in the match rate at that
point. This would, however, not be a valid
methodology, because AGI is net of
retirement contributions, with the
exception of the Roth IRA. As a result,
even taking gross income (defined as AGI
with all retirement contributions added
back) as exogenous, rational tax filers just
above the boundary have incentives to
contribute in order to fall below the
boundary and benefit from the higher
credit rate. AGI is therefore endogenous. 
An implication is that if tax filers were
rational, we should expect an abnormally
large number of pension contributors
bunching just below the boundary point.
Symmetrically, we should expect to see
few retirement contributors just above the
boundary, since increasing contributions
even a little would increase the credit by a
discrete percentage (and the higher credit
rate would apply to the entire
contribution). Finding bunching below the
boundary point (and fewer contributors
above the boundary) would constitute
convincing evidence that individuals
understand and respond to the incentives
provided by the Saver’s Credit.
In practice, tax filers may not be aware of
the precise dollar amount of their annual
incomes and pension contributions.32
Furthermore, it might be difficult for tax
filers to tailor their pension contributions
(often specified as a percentage of salary)
during the year so that their AGI falls
precisely below the boundary points.
However, the X-IRA is the ideal product to
take advantage of the Saver’s Credit. At
the time of tax preparation, the exact AGI
amount is revealed and it is easy to
estimate the current Saver’s Credit rate
and whether a tax filer could benefit from
a higher rate by making X-IRA
contributions.33
In the H&R Block tax return preparation
process, optimizing choices regarding the
Saver’s Credit is left to the judgment and
skill of the client or the tax professional; it
is not flagged as a specific item in the
standard F10 sequence.  Some tax
professionals understand the Saver’s
Credit well and can play with numbers in
the X-IRA screen to flag Saver’s Credit
opportunities to clients. The lack of
systematic software support, however,
means that we should expect that tax
filers will be much less informed about the
potential benefits of the Saver’s Credit
than about our simple and very salient
matching experiment.34
Graphical evidence around the 50
percent-20 percent credit rate boundary
To investigate responses to the Saver’s
Credit, we use pre-experiment data
consisting of tax returns filed in the 6023 may 2005
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offices before March 5th.  There are
85,000 returns in our data with about 2.3
percent of all returns making an X-IRA
contribution.35 We discard about 7,000
returns of filers ineligible to make IRA
contributions (these are mostly retirees
with no earned income). We multiply
incomes of single and married filing
separately tax filers by 2 and incomes of
head of households by 1.3333 so that the
boundary points, where the Saver’s Credit
rate changes, are aligned for all types of
tax filers. We called these income figures
normalized AGI (see Table 8). We
concentrate on the first boundary, at a
normalized income of $30,000, where
the equivalent match rate falls from
100 percent to 25 percent since this is
by far the largest discontinuity in the
match rate.
Figure 2A plots the percent of tax returns
making an X-IRA contribution by $500
AGI bands from normalized AGI $25,001
to $35,000. For example, the group
$25,001 to $25,500 is denoted by 25 on
the graph. There is a clear spike in the
fraction contributing for the band $29,501
to $30,000 (denoted by 29.5 on the
graph), which is exactly the band below
the $30,000 boundary. The fraction
contributing is the highest in that very
band (among all 20 bands depicted in the
figure) suggesting that the spike is not
due to chance alone. 
To further test the hypothesis that the
spike is due to the Saver’s Credit, we
divide tax filers into “eligibles,” those
whose X-IRA contribution (real or
potential) would trigger a positive Saver’s
Credit not offset by reductions in other
credits, and “ineligibles.”36 Figure 2B
shows the likelihood of being an X-IRA
contributor for eligibles (dark shading) and
ineligibles (light shading). The figure
appears broadly consistent with the tax
explanation. The spike is sharp, with over
8 percent of eligible filers in the $29,501-
$30,000 band making a contribution.  For
ineligibles, the spike is less pronounced
(two bands among the twenty bands
displayed have higher contribution rates)
and contribution rates on the left and
right of the boundary which appear
roughly similar in size. It is possible that
the small spike in the number of
contributors just below the boundary for
those ineligible is due to clients and tax
professionals (or clients themselves)
incorrectly believing that the Saver’s
Credit will provide a net financial benefit.37
In contrast to theoretical expectations,
however, we do not observe a clear dip in
contribution rates on the right of the
boundary for those eligible.  In principle,
many of those filers could significantly
increase their tax refund by contributing
more to the X-IRA and hence possibly
increase both their X-IRA savings and
their after-tax current income net of X-IRA
contributions.38 We also note that, on
average, contribution rates are onlyThe Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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slightly higher on the left of the boundary
(around 5.5 percent) than on the right
(around 3.5 percent), suggesting that the
100 percent match rate has at best small
incentive effects relative to the 25 percent
match rate. 
Figure 3 plots separately the number of
Traditional and Roth IRAs opened by AGI
income bands for the eligible. Contributing
to a Roth IRA does not change AGI (as a
Roth IRA is an after-tax contribution).
Consistent with the incentive explanation,
we see no spike in the Roth IRAs at the
boundary. We note that the numbers of
Traditional and Roth X-IRAs are both
slightly higher on the left than on the right
of the boundary, consistent with a small
response to the incentives. We also note
that some filers contribute to Roth X-IRAs
just on the right on the boundary when
contributing the same amount to a
Traditional X-IRA would have pushed
them below the boundary and given them
the higher credit rate, suggesting that they
are not optimizing their tax savings (since
it is implausible that any differences in the
tax treatment of Roth and Traditional IRAs
would overwhelm the effects of the higher
credit rate under the Saver’s Credit). 
Figure 4 plots the percent of returns
contributing to an X-IRA by bands of AGI
inclusive of traditional X-IRA contributions
(denoted by AGI cum X-IRA). In that
figure, the spike at the boundary
disappears, providing further evidence
that the spike is indeed created by filers
making Traditional X-IRA contributions in
order to take advantage of the higher
credit rate.39
Figure 5 plots the percent of returns with
positive retirement contributions (all IRA
types, and other retirement contributions)
among all those potentially eligible for the
Saver’s Credit. The percent with any
retirement contributions (such as 401(k)s,
other IRAs, etc.) is much higher than the
fraction with X-IRAs (from Figure 2A).
However, no spike at the boundary is
visible (the X-IRA spike effect has been
diluted). There appears to be a drop in the
fraction contributing but it occurs $1,000
above the boundary. This might be simply25 may 2005
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noise due to small sample size or might
be evidence of failure to optimize
(something we will investigate with a
larger data set). 
Finally, Figure 6 displays the mean X-IRA
contributions per contributor for eligible
and ineligible tax filers by AGI bands. The
mean contributions are quite close to the
minimum $300 contribution for X-IRAs and
do not display a clear pattern across
groups, suggesting that the higher credit
rate has little impact on the amount of
contributions (note that the amounts are
implicitly inclusive of the match equivalent
rate as the Saver’s Credit is a tax rebate
which does not change contributions).
About 75 percent of X-IRA contributors
make the minimum $300 contribution.
Furthermore, this proportion of minimum
contributors does not seem to go down
when the maximum X-IRA amount eligible
for the credit is above $300. Therefore, it
seems unlikely that a substantial fraction of
X-IRA contributors eligible for the Saver’s
Credit choose their contribution amounts
to maximize their Saver’s Credit.40 This
seems to be another important difference
between the Saver’s Credit and our
experiment, where there was significant
bunching of contributions at $1,000. 
Estimates of the Saver’s Credit effects
on X-IRA take-up and amounts
The graphical analysis suggests that
simple difference-in-differences
comparisons could be made to estimate
the effects of the large 100 percent
match-equivalent credit rate relative to the
much lower 25 percent or 11.1 percent
equivalent rates generated by the Saver’s
Credit based on AGI, using the fact that
both the AGI and the amount of other
credits determine whether a particular tax
filer may benefit from the Saver’s Credit. 
We first compare Saver’s Credit eligible
tax filers with normalized AGI between
$25,001 and $30,000 (entitled to a 100
percent equivalent match rate from the
Saver’s Credit) to those with AGI between
$30,001 and $35,000 (entitled to a 25
percent equivalent match rate or 11.1
percent equivalent rate, see Table 8).
Columns (1) and (2) in Panel A of Table 9
display the X-IRA contribution rate,
average X-IRA contributions, and
conditional X-IRA contributions for those
two groups respectively. Finally, column
(3) displays the differences between the
100 percent group and the 25 percent or
11 percent group.
These differences are small: the X-IRA
take-up rate difference is only 2.2
percentage points for a match rate
increase from 11 or 25 percent to 100
percent. This difference is much smaller
than the 7.4 percentage points difference
we found between our 20 percent and 50
percent experimental match rates.
Furthermore, this simple difference
estimate is likely to overestimate the
effect of the match rate due to the
artificial “piling up” effect below the
boundary that we described above.
Indeed, if we exclude boundary tax filers
with AGI between $29,001 and $31,000,
the difference becomes even smaller (1.7
percentage points). As we expected from
the graphical analysis, there is a $18
insignificant difference in amounts
conditional on contribution (the
unconditional difference in X-IRA amounts
is $9.70).
Another reason why the figure may be an
overestimate is that the differences in
take-up rates might not be due to the
causal effects of differences in the Saver’s
Credit rate but rather the fact that taxThe Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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Table 9: The Effects of the Saver's Credit on X-IRA Behavior
100% match  25% or 11% match Difference between
rate group rate group 100% and 2
Normalized AGI Normalized AGI 5% or 11%
$25,001-$30,000 $30,001-$35,000 match groups
(1)-(2)
(1) (2) (3)
A. Savers' credit eligible taxpayers
X-IRA take up rate 5.54 3.32 2.22
(percent) (0.35) (0.25) (0.42)
X-IRA average contributions  $24.2 $14.5 $9.7
(unconditional) (2.03) (1.31) (2.3)
X-IRA average contributions  $398.4 $380.7 $17.7
(conditional on take-up) (23.3) (22.1) (32.9)
Sample size 4,227 5,154 9,381
B. Savers' credit ineligible taxpayers
X-IRA take up rate 4.56 3.60 0.96
(percent) (0.36) (0.55) (0.70)
X-IRA average contributions  $18.0 $15.7 $2.3
(unconditional) (1.53) (2.66) (3.0)
X-IRA average contributions  $347.7 $372.9 -$25.2
(conditional on take-up) (14.6) (35.3) (29.4)
Sample size 3,311 1,140  4,451
C. Difference between eligible and ineligible taxpayers (A-B)
DD estimates
X-IRA take up rate 0.98 -0.28 1.26
(percent) (0.51) (0.59) (0.81)
X-IRA average contributions  $6.2 -$1.2 $7.4
(unconditional) (2.67) (3.06) (4.24)
X-IRA average contributions  $50.7 $7.8 $42.9
(conditional on take-up) (30.9) (47.9) (58.1)
Sample size 7,538 6,294 13,832
Notes: This table shows X-IRA take up rates, average contributions (unconditional including zeros and conditional on
take-up, excluding zeros) for various groups as well as differences and difference-in-differences. Standard errors are
reported in parenthesis.
First, groups are defined relative to normalized AGI (100% of AGI for married taxpayers, 133.33% for Heads of
household, and 200% for singles and others).
Group (1) with AGI between $25,001 and $30,000 faces a Saver's Credit rate of 50% or equivalent match rate of 100%
when eligible.
Group (2) with AGI between $30,001 and $35,000 faces a Saver's Credit rate of 20% or 10% or equivalent match rate
of 25% or 11% when eligible.
Column (3) displays the difference between group (1) and group (2).
Second, groups are defined by Saver's Credit eligibility.
Group A are eligible, defined as taxpayers whose X-IRA contributions (actual or potential) would benefit from Saver's
Credit.
Group B are the ineligible, defined as taxpayers whose X-IRA contributions (actual or potential) would not benefit from
Saver's Credit because their tax liability net of other non refundable tax credits (excluding the child tax credit) and net of
(full tax credit less potentially refundable additional tax credit) is zero or negative.
Panel C displays the difference between group A and group B. The bottom right panel displays the difference-in-
differences (1A-1B)-(2A-2B).27 may 2005
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filers with different AGI also have different
propensities to save. A simple way to
control for this is to consider the same
AGI groups for tax filers ineligible for the
Saver’s Credit because they lack income
tax liability before refundable credits.
Panel B of Table 9 displays take-up rates
and amounts for those two control
groups along with the corresponding
difference in column (3). For those
groups, there are small but insignificant
differences in X-IRA take up rates and
contribution amounts. 
Panel C displays the difference between
Panel A (the eligible) and Panel B (the
ineligible). If those two groups were
identical in their savings tastes, such
differences could also potentially
capture the Saver’s Credit effect. Those
differences are even smaller than the
results in Panel A. In column (1), the
difference in contribution rates is just
0.98 percentage points for the 100
percent match rate and –0.28 percentage
points for the 11 percent or 25 percent
match group. These negligible effects
could be due either to the fact that the
Saver’s Credit has almost no impact
(and the differences in Panel A were
biased upward), or that eligible and
non-eligible are systematically different.
Indeed, the eligible tend to have fewer
dependent kids and are more likely to be
single, and hence perhaps have a lower
taste for savings.41 Differences in
amounts are equally small and barely
significant. 
Finally, column (3) in Panel C displays the
differences-in-differences estimates.
These are unbiased estimates of the
differential impact of the 100 percent rate
relative to the 11 percent or 25 percent
match rate if one is willing to assume
that, absent the Saver’s Credit, the
difference in X-IRA behavior between
eligible and ineligible filers would be the
same across the two AGI groups.42 All
difference-in-differences are small (and
insignificant) suggesting again small
effects from the Saver’s Credit. For
example, the difference-in-differences
take-up rate estimate is only 1.26
percentage points and insignificant.
These results suggest modest effects of
the Saver’s Credit on take-up and
especially on amounts contributed. This
contrasts with the results of our
experiment, which suggested large
effects. We propose explanations for
these striking differences and future tests
in the conclusion.
Conclusions 
This experiment has uncovered a number
of intriguing findings. First, simple and
saliently presented matching incentives
for IRA contributions at the time of tax
preparation can have a sizeable impact
on IRA take-up rates and on the amounts
contributed. IRA contributions (excluding
matches) were 4 and 8 times higher with
a match rate of 20 percent and 50
percent (respectively) than with no match.
With matches included, IRA deposits are
5 and 11 times higher than with no
match. 
Second, the effects are largest for
married tax filers: 25 percent of low- and
middle-income married filers contributed
to an X-IRA when offered a 50 percent
match. For married tax filers, furthermore,
the effects are relatively constant across
AGI groups, suggesting that even low-
and middle-income married families
would raise their saving in response to a
higher match rate.
Third, tax professionals play a key role in
the savings decisions of their clients. Tax
professionals who had relatively high
client X-IRA take-up rates in the tax
season before the experiment started
generated much higher take-up rates
than those who did not. 
Fourth, tax filers apparently did not think
about gaming the system by contributing
and withdrawing the money very quickly
afterwards. Indeed, the take-up rates are
too low to be consistent with a
systematic “gaming” of the system, only
about 60 percent of those contributing
chose a Roth IRA (which has much more
generous early withdrawal rules forThe Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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principal), and virtually no contributors,
even among those benefiting from a
match rate, made withdrawals in the
weeks following the experiment.  
The third and fourth findings suggest
that tax filers may not be fully informed
about savings decisions and hence
may rely to a large extent on the advice
and trust they place on their tax
professional. 
We compared the experimental results
with those generated by the existing
Saver’s Credit, which provides an
effective match for retirement savings
contributions through the tax code. The
graphical analysis shows a clear effect of
the differential effective matching rates in
the Saver’s Credit, but simple group
analysis indicates that the quantitative
effects of the Saver’s Credit rates on X-
IRA behavior are at best modest. The
upper bound of the difference in take-up
rates between a 100 percent and a 25
percent equivalent match rate in the
Saver’s Credit is only 2.5 percentage
points.  Potentially, larger data samples
could be used to tackle this question in a
much more precise way. Such an analysis
would also require a careful and detailed
analysis of the effects of the Saver’s
Credit, as currently designed, on the
inter-temporal budget sets of tax filers
and the likely effects on X-IRA behavior.
For example, the extent of bunching
below the boundary contains information
on the size of the behavioral response.
Such work, both theoretical and
empirical, is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
More importantly, the dramatic difference in
the size of the responses between our
experiment and the Saver’s Credit
experience needs to be understood. One
possibility is that the population on which
we estimated the impact of the Saver’s
Credit is very different from the population
on which we estimated the impact of the
experiment (those who file early in the
season may be more likely to be liquidity
constrained than those who file later in the
season). This will need to be assessed by
estimating the impact of the Saver’s
Credit among later filers (using another
year of data or another city). We suspect,
however, that a large part of the difference
may be due to the different ways in which
the match is presented in our experiment
compared to the Saver’s Credit.  With
the Saver’s Credit, as currently designed,
both the equivalent match rate and the
maximum eligible contribution are not
easy to decipher.43 The differential
responses thus may represent another
piece of evidence suggesting that framing
effects are important for understanding
behavioral responses. As optimal policy
making depends closely on those
behavioral responses, an important task for
future empirical work is to go beyond
merely estimating the size of behavioral
responses and start exploring which
factors shape the size of the behavioral
response.  
In summary, the results from a large-scale
randomized experiment suggest that the
combination of a significant and readily
understandable match for saving, easily
accessible savings vehicles, the
opportunity to use part of an income tax
refund to save, and professional
assistance could generate a significant
increase in retirement saving participation
and contributions, even among middle-
and low-income households.29 may 2005
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Endnotes
1 See Burman et al (2004) for data on defined contribution pension coverage rates by income group.
Calculations from the 2001 SCF imply that only one quarter of households with income below $40,000 have
defined benefit coverage.  Burman et al (2004, Appendix Table 6) report that among households with cash
income below $40,000, less than 2.1 percent contributed to either a Roth or traditional IRA in 2004.  Median
net financial wealth in the text is calculated from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
2 For a discussion of efforts to increase saving among low-income households through Individual
Development Accounts and other accounts, see Sherraden (1991) and Boshara (2005).
3 Gale, Iwry, and Orszag (2005) examine the Saver’s Credit in more detail.
4 Some studies (e.g., Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox 1998) find that the existence of a match raises 401(k) sav-
ing, but that a higher match rate itself does not.  Other studies (e.g., General Accounting Office 1997) have
even found that a higher match rate, conditional on the existence of a match, actually reduces 401(k) saving
because the income effect dominates the substitution effect.  Still other studies (e.g., Papke and Poterba 1995)
find that higher match rates do increase 401(k) saving.  One recent study, Engelhardt and Kumar (2004), found
a positive but modest effect of match rates using individual level Health and Retirement Survey data. Their
results suggest that introducing a 20 percent or 50 percent match rate should increase dollar contributions by
about 10 percent and 25 percent respectively.  Nonetheless, the effects of 401(k) match rates, conditional on a
match existing, remain unclear.  Bernheim (2003) identifies this as an important and unresolved empirical issue.
5 H&R Block also provides the tax preparation software “Tax Cut” which is the second largest tax software
program in terms of market share and is used by millions of tax filers to prepare their own tax returns.
6 Since 2002, tax filers have the option to set up automatic monthly contributions to their X-IRA account from
their bank account. The minimum monthly contribution is $25.  
7 There is also a $25 account termination fee. Contributions or withdrawals by mail are free.
8 Tax professionals are paid $5.50 for each X-IRA account opened or re-contributed to by their clients. More
generally, a tax professional receives greater compensation for completing a more complicated tax return.
9 In the case of married tax filers, modifying the order to the tax filers listed on the returns could have possibly
increased the odds of getting a more generous offer. Tax professionals did not know that assignment was
based on Social Security number and therefore presumably very few tax professionals did this reordering sys-
tematically. We discuss this point further in the descriptive statistics section.
10 During the first week of the experiment, from March 5th to March 12th, single or head of household tax fil-
ers who declined to contribute to the X-IRA were not properly recorded by the TPS software as being offered
the X-IRA even if their tax professional hit the X-IRA screen. We exclude those observations when we study
offer rates.  
11 It is possible for some tax professionals to reach the offer screen and decline the offer without presenting
the offer to the clients.  In our data this will still appear as a client having been offered the X-IRA.
12 A second set of training sessions for the 15 additional offices was organized by Scott McBride on March 8-9.
13 H&R Block headquarters is capable of monitoring cases in which an IRA deposit was immediately rescinded
and hence discover systematic patterns of behavior. We show later in the paper that to date there have been
only a handful of instances in which tax filers made withdrawals. 
14 There is no age limit to make IRA contributions as long as tax filers have earned income. Almost no tax filer
had reached the maximum IRA contributions for both 2004 and 2005 at the time of tax preparation. Tax filers
with high AGI can still make non-deductible traditional IRA contributions which qualified for the experimental
match.
15 This difference could be due to chance.  Alternatively, in a few instances, tax professionals may have modi-
fied the ordering of the spouses on a joint return when the first draw of the offer generated a zero match, to see
if this change randomized the couple into a better offer.  In a future revision to this paper, we plan to correct for
this possibility by using the ordering of tax filers in the previous tax season to assign to the tax filer to an
“intended treatment” for the 74 percent of the married tax filers in our sample who filed their taxes with H&R
Block the previous year.  Since the difference in assignment of married couples across groups is minimal, our
results should not be greatly affected.31 may 2005
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16 These data exclude the first week of the experiment (from March 5th to March 11th) when, due to a soft-
ware glitch, the occurrence of the pop-up screen was not properly recorded. 
17 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano (2005) obtain much larger take-up rates (around 15 percent) for a split tax
refund option in an experiment in Tulsa Oklahoma with a non-profit tax preparer. In the Tulsa experiment, the
refund was split into a regular savings account set up at the time of tax preparation. Demand for split refunds in
Tulsa may possibly have been higher than X-IRA demand in the absence of any additional match because the
Tulsa version allowed tax filers to set up savings accounts for free and the money in the savings account could
be withdrawn at any time with no penalty (95 percent of initial contributions had been withdrawn from the Tulsa
saving accounts 6-8 months after set-up).
18 For example, in comparing the no-match and the 20-percent match group, (1+match rate) rises from 1 to
1.2 and the take-up rate rises from 3.31 to 9.64.  The elasticity is therefore [ln(9.64)-ln(3.31)]/[ln(1.2)-ln(1)], or
5.9.
19 Our analysis is always done at the tax return level. In the case of married filing jointly, the tax return includes
both spouses. Each spouse can separately open an X-IRA. In our analysis, a tax return for married joint filer is
defined as having contributed to an X-IRA if at least one of the spouses contributes and the contribution
amounts are defined as the sum of contributions for the two spouses. We also analyze subsequently the
spousal decision to open a second X-IRA.
20 The take-up rate for married filers (considered as individuals) is simply the average of the married taxpayer
take up rate and the spousal take up rate from Table 2, Panel B. Those married individual take up rates are 1.9
percent, 10.8 percent, and 20.4 percent for each of the three groups. This shows that married filers, considered
as individuals, are somewhat more responsive to match incentives than single filers. 
21 We have not done any adjustment for income growth because the nominal income growth between 2000
and 2004 will be very close to zero. Internal Revenue Statistics show that average nominal income per tax
return in 2003 was still 3 percent lower than in 2000.
22 More precisely, these are the tax professionals who had client X-IRA take-up rates of less than 1.5 percent
of tax returns they prepared this season before March 5th.
23 That is, we control for all the variables in specification 3 and 6 in Table 5. To save space, we do not report
these coefficients.  
24 An exception would be when a new client is referred to a tax professional by a friend.
25 The results are essentially identical when we separate the tax professional into those with no X-IRAs taken
up by the other clients that they served during the experiment (one third of observations), and those with at
least one X-IRA taken up by their other clients (two thirds of observations). 
26 The dummy variable is defined by the Social Security number assignment rule and irrespective of whether
the tax pro clicked on the X-IRA window and made the corresponding offer to the client.
27 There is a large and controversial academic literature on the effects of 401(k) plans on the net worth of
households (see Bernheim, 2003, Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996) and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) for sur-
veys). 
28 As we discussed earlier, if all tax filers were rational and not severely credit constrained, take up rates for the
20 percent and especially the 50 percent match rate should have been much higher as tax filers are able to
cash out contributions (including the match) after the match is deposited on their account on April 15th subject
to the relatively small IRS penalties for early IRA withdrawals. It is therefore important to assess whether with-
drawals are important and whether they vary by match rate groups.
29 Those contributions are netted of any withdrawals made during the last three years so that tax filers do not
game the program.
30 The Saver’s Credit is determined before refundable credits. Therefore, the Earned Income Tax Credit and the
refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit do not reduce the Saver’s Credit.  
31 More precisely, we define a tax filer as potentially benefiting from the Saver’s Credit if, starting from no retire-
ment contributions, his/her tax refund would increase or tax liability decrease due to the Saver’s Credit should
he/she make a retirement contribution. The Retirement Security Project  •  Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families
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32 Indeed, annual salary contracts rarely run from January 1st to December 1st. Actual payment dates for
work in December might fall in January. There are a number of additional factors, such as Social Security and
Medicare taxes, pre-tax parking and health care contributions, which make it difficult to evaluate precisely tax-
able wages and salaries before the W2 form arrives in January. At that time, it is too late to modify employer
pension plan contributions. 
33 IRA contributions are in general made during the tax season once the AGI information is revealed and are
clearly an easier tool for tax optimizing than employer’s automatic monthly pension contributions.
34 H&R Block routinely updates the TPS software through the tax season depending on tax law changes and
tax professional feedback.
35 In future work, we plan on using a much larger sample to do a comprehensive and more precise analysis of
the Saver’s Credit.
36 Because of the complex interaction with the Child Tax Credit, many tax filers do not benefit from the Saver’s
Credit even if their return shows a positive Saver’s Credit.
37 Our dataset is not large enough to investigate this issue precisely. We will be able to analyze this effect by
separating naïve eligible from truly eligible when we have access to a larger dataset.
38 Analyzing more precisely whether many tax filers are in that dominated situation would require a larger
dataset and is left for a future revision.
39 Indeed, the largest number of filers crossing a particular AGI threshold due to their Traditional X-IRA contri-
butions occurs precisely at $30,000. Furthermore, about 40 percent of those crossers had non X-IRA contribu-
tions (a much larger percentage than for the average X-IRA contributors). This suggests that some filers strate-
gically use X-IRAs to make their other retirement contributions qualify for the higher rate. 
40 We will analyze this issue in more detail when we have access to more data.
41 With a larger data sample, the same analysis could be repeated within marital status group and within
households with the same number of dependents (exploiting for example the fact that the child tax credit is only
for children up to age 16 and that families with children aged 16 or 17 should be quite comparable). 
42 Such a hypothesis could be tested using 2001 tax data (2002 tax season) when the X-IRA was fully
deployed and the Saver’s Credit did not exist yet.
43 Furthermore, experimental work has shown that credit rates are much less effective than equivalent match
rates to induce people to contribute to charities (see e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 2003). It is possible that pre-
senting the Saver’s Credit as a 100 percent match rather than a 50 percent credit rate could have a large effect
on take-up.  This is something we plan to test in the future.Esther Duflo,Professor of Economics,
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Mission Statement      
The Retirement Security Project is
dedicated to promoting common
sense solutions to improve the
retirement income prospects of
millions of American workers.
The goal of The Retirement
Security Project is to work on a
nonpartisan basis to make it easier
and increase incentives for middle-
and lower-income Americans to
save for a financially secure
retirement.